University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
International Program Papers

Student Works

2019

A Review of Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia
Audrey Cho
Audrey.Cho@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
international_immersion_program_papers

Recommended Citation
Cho, Audrey, "A Review of Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia" (2019). International Program
Papers. 122.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/international_immersion_program_papers/122

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in International Program Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound.
For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

A Review of Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia
Audrey Cho ‘19

Table of Contents
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2
Corporate Governance .................................................................................................. 3

I.
a.
b.
c.

II.

The Importance of Corporate Governance ............................................................................ 3
The Importance of Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia ..................................... 4
The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ............................................................ 5
i.
The Board of Directors .............................................................................................................. 6
ii. Disclosure and Transparency .................................................................................................... 8
iii. Shareholder Rights .................................................................................................................... 9

Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia ......................................................10

The Board of Directors ......................................................................................................... 11
i.
Board Independence ................................................................................................................ 11
ii. Diversity .................................................................................................................................... 12
b. Disclosure and Transparency ............................................................................................... 13
c.
Shareholder Rights ............................................................................................................... 14
a.

III.
a.
b.

IV.

The Future of Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia ...............................15
Morocco ................................................................................................................................ 16
Tunisia .................................................................................................................................. 16

Conclusion ................................................................................................................17

1

Introduction
In 2006, two years before the U.S. stock market crashed1 and triggered a global financial
crisis,2 the Saudi Stock Exchange crashed.3 The crash affected the entire Middle East and North
Africa (“MENA”) region, making clear that MENA investors were not adequately informed
about their shares, and that the information that companies presented about their financial and
non-financial figures were incomplete, not subject to enough regulatory scrutiny.4 These
insufficiencies prompted a desire to improve “information flow to the investing public”5 in the
Middle East and North Africa, marking the beginning of a corporate governance reform in the
region. However, MENA is hardly today’s global leader in corporate governance. Thus, this
paper surveys the current state of corporate governance in two MENA countries—Morocco and
Tunisia—and raises challenges to the future of corporate governance in these two nations.
Part I explains the importance of corporate governance, and particularly for Morocco and
Tunisia. It provides the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, an international benchmark
to assess a country’s corporate governance practices. It identifies three key areas of corporate
governance principles—the board of directors, transparency and disclosure, and shareholder
rights. Part II reviews the current state of corporate governance in Morocco and Tunisia. Part III
discusses the potential changes to the political, economic, and legal systems of Morocco and
1

On September 29, 2008, the Dow fell 777.68 points (7.7%), the biggest drop in intra-day trading the U.S. had ever
seen up to that point. See Liz Moyer and Robert Hum, Dow’s Nearly 1,6000-Point Plunge Marks its Biggest OneDay Point Drop Ever, CNBC (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/05/dows-nearly-1600-point-plungemarks-its-biggest-one-day-point-drop-ever.html.
2
The global financial crisis also saw the MENA region face challenges to its financial markets, crude oil markets,
investments, tourism, and non-oil exports during the 2008 crisis. See Nader Habibi, The Impact of the Global
Economic Crisis on Arab Countries: A Year-End Assessment, CROWN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES,
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY (Dec. 2009).
3
For more information about the crash, a report funded by the Saudi Capital Market Authority is available. See Josh
Lerner, Ann Leamon, Steve Dew, The CMA and the Saudi Stock Market Crash of 2006, CMA (2017),
https://cma.org.sa/en/Market/Documents/CMA_Crash2006_en.pdf.
4
See Alissa Koldertsova, The Second Corporate Governance Wave in the Middle East and North Africa, OECD,
221-222 (2011).
5
Id.
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Tunisia in the upcoming years that may affect the future of corporate governance in these two
countries. Part IV concludes.
I.

Corporate Governance
a. The Importance of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance dictates the way in which a company is run. It refers to a set of

rules that dictate the relationship between a company’s management, board of directors,
shareholders, and stakeholders. It provides the structure through which a company’s objectives
are set, the means of attaining those objectives, and the monitoring of performance.6 Because
corporate governance provides a legal and contractual mechanism for accountability,
transparency, and adequate disclosure,7 its proper implementation not only serves as checks on
the board and management, but also fosters confidence in a company’s board and trust between
the various internal and external participants of a company.8 This in turn enhances the reputation
of a company as a secure business to invest in, helping the firm attract long-term investments.9 In
fact, studies have shown that companies with good corporate governance are assessed at a higher
valuation than those that do not.10 Another empirical study has found that countries that
implement good corporate governance measures “generally experienced robust growth of
corporate sectors and [a] higher ability to attract capital than those that have not.”11 As such,
corporate governance can directly contribute to the economic stability, success, and longevity of
a company, as well as a country.

6

G20/ OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015) (herein referred to as “Principles”).
See Abdussalam Mahmoud Abu-Tapanjeh, Corporate Governance from the Islamic Perspective: A Comparative
Analysis with OECD Principles, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING (2009).
8
See Principles, supra note 6, at 7.
9
Id.; see also G. J. Rossouw, Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in Africa, BUSINESS & SOCIETY (Mar.
2005).
10
Abdussalam supra note 7, at 559.
11
Id.
7
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b. The Importance of Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia
Emerging market countries that want and need to prove themselves to the investing
public should focus on establishing and enforcing strong corporate governance principles.12 For
MENA countries such as Morocco and Tunisia that have faced major political changes in the
past decade and face threats to national security in the present day, this point is particularly
salient.13 In the face of such changes, Morocco and Tunisia need to prioritize corporate
governance in order to signal to investors that their countries are stable enough to invest in, with
strong mechanisms that will protect their investments from mismanagement or corruption.
The importance of corporate governance for Morocco and Tunisia is best understood
against the backdrop of recent political changes. In December 2010, a distraught fruit-seller set
himself on fire in protest against Tunisia’s corrupt police and government.14 This tragic yet
memorable display of frustration against corruption resonated with not only Tunisians, but also
with the rest of the Arab region. Soon, protests broke out across the rest of the Middle East and
Africa, ousting Tunisia’s President Ben Ali15 and turning Morocco into a constitutional
monarchy.16 The Arab Spring resulted in democratic elections for Tunisia and in a constitutional
monarchy for Morocco, which gave more power to the elected prime minister.17 However, it also

12

See Ahmed A. Sarhan and Collins G. Ntim, Firm- and Country-Level Antecedents of Corporate Governance
Compliance and Disclosure, MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. (2018).
13
For example, in Tunisia, the U.S. Department of State increased its travel advisory level from 1 to 2 in early 2019.
Tunisia country faces terrorism threats in various regions, including along the border it shares with Libya. Moreover,
in 2015, terrorists attacked the Bardo National Museum which sits adjacent to its Parliament, killing more than 30
people. Chris Stephen, Kareem Shaheen, Mark Tran, Tunis Museum Attack: 20 People Killed After Hostage Drama
at Tourist Site, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/18/eight-people-killedin-attack-on-tunisia-bardo-museum.
14
The Arab Spring: A Year Of Revolution, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 17, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution.
15
Dave Gilbert, Ben Ali: First Leader Toppled in Arab Spring, CNN (Jan. 4, 2012),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/01/04/world/africa/ben-ali-profile/index.html.
16
James N. Sater, Morocco’s “Arab” Spring, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (Oct. 1, 2011),
https://www.mei.edu/publications/moroccos-arab-spring.
17
King Declares Morocco a Constitutional Monarchy, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2011),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/king-declares-morocco-a-constitutional-monarchy/.
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shook the confidence of investors. The Arab Spring resulted “in large losses for virtually all
MENA markets in 2011,” “even more than the international financial crisis.”18 Moreover,
corruption remains a problem in the MENA region,19 which is an added “obstacle for businesses
investing in”20 MENA countries.
Despite these problems, Morocco and Tunisia have a chance to be financial leaders in the
MENA region. Africa “presents the single largest growth opportunity in the world and is a new
frontier for many international businesses.”21 Furthermore, Morocco maintains a strategic
geographic position that is conducive to it becoming a powerful and “major gateway” to the rest
of the MENA market.22 In order to realize its full potential, MENA needs to win the confidence
of international and domestic investors. It needs to signal that its markets are unfazed by political
turmoil and stable enough to retain investments. To shake off the reputation of “corruption and
unethical business practices that scar Africa’s business image,” strong corporate governance is
necessary to institute the very “market discipline and transparency”23 that investors need to see.
c. The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Principles of
Corporate Governance is a nonbinding set of principles that has served as an international

18

The Role of MENA Stock Exchanges in Corporate Governance, OECD (2012).
Combating corruption remains a priority for both these countries. See Morocco Corruption Report, GAN
BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL (Oct. 2016), https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/countryprofiles/morocco/; Anti-Corruption Digest Morocco, ECONOMIC CRIME AND COOPERATION DIVISION, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE (Mar. 2019), https://www.coe.int/en/web/corruption/anti-corruption-digest/morocco; Hundred Protest
Rampant Corruption, Bribery in Morocco, MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20181015-hundreds-protest-rampant-corruption-bribery-in-morocco/; Tunisia
Corruption Report, GAN BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL (July 2017), https://www.business-anticorruption.com/country-profiles/tunisia/; Anti-Corruption Digest Tunisia, ECONOMIC CRIME AND COOPERATION
DIVISION, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Mar. 2019), https://www.coe.int/en/web/corruption/anti-corruption-digest/tunisia.
20
Tunisia Corruption Report supra note 19.
21
Overseas Business Risk – Morocco, UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-morocco/overseas-business-risk-morocco.
22
Id.
23
Rossouw supra note 9, at 95.
19
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benchmark to assess a country’s and/or company’s corporate governance quality since 1999. In
2015, the OECD disseminated an updated review of its Principles in conjunction with the G20, a
partnership that aimed to give the Principles a wider, more “global reach.”24 As such, whether a
country’s corporate governance code or a company’s corporate governance standards conforms
with these Principles is a helpful measure to evaluate performance. This paper summarizes the
Principles’ key areas of concern, and uses the Principles as a benchmark to assess Morocco’s and
Tunisia’s corporate governance codes and practices.
Among others, the OECD focuses on corporate governance issues such as: (1) the board
of directors, such as its independence and diversity; (2) disclosure and transparency to
shareholders and stakeholders; and (3) shareholder rights, particularly the treatment of minority
shareholders and their rights.25 These three areas are universally examined by scholars when
judging the quality of corporate governance; the OECD is not singular in this regard.26
i. The Board of Directors
The board of directors represents the shareholders of the company as their fiduciary. It
guides corporate strategy, establishes policies that “monitor[s] managerial performance,” and
balances the various interests of a corporation.27
1. Independence
24

Principles supra note 6, at 7.
The OECD Principles are technically comprised of six principles, but many of these can be merged into the
categories above. The six principles are: (1) Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework
(enforcement); (2) The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions; (3) Institutional
investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries; (4) The role of stakeholders in corporate governance; (5)
Disclosure and transparency; and (6) The responsibilities of the board. Other areas of corporate governance exist
(though arguably within these principles and categories), such as executive compensation and audits.
26
For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) divides corporate governance
into five broad sections that roughly correspond with the categories above: (1) Structure and Functioning of the
Board; (2) Transparency and Disclosure of Company Information; (3) Internal Control; (4) Rights of Shareholders;
(5) Stakeholders and Institutions. See Corporate Governance Sector Assessment, EBRD,
https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/legal-reform/corporate-governance/sector-assessment.html.
27
Principles, supra note 6 at 45; see also James Chen, Board of Directors, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/boardofdirectors.asp.
25
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A board must be independent and objective to make the best decisions for and on behalf
of its shareholders. While there are varying definitions of board independence,28 it means that
directors are making decisions unfettered by any links or loyalty to anyone other than the
shareholders, such as the controlling shareholder or management.29 Independence leads to better
and more objective management oversight, thus stronger protection of shareholder interests.
To achieve this goal, the OECD recommends separating the role of the chief executive
and the chairman of the board.30 According to the OECD, this distinction can help “achieve an
appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and improve the board’s capacity for
decision making independent of management.”31 Further, the OECD recommends that a
“sufficient number of board members” be “independent of management”32 or of a “dominant
shareholder.”33 While the OECD does not define what suffices as a “sufficient number,” it refers
to countries that have required a “significant part, in some instances a majority,” of the board to
be independent.34
2. Diversity
A more recently highlighted, yet equally critical criteria for board composition is the
diversity of the board. The direct effects of board diversity on a firm’s financial bottom line has

28

For example, in the U.S., independence refers to a “state of mind.” The New York Stock Exchange rule on
independence only requires that a director not have served the company recently. However, in the U.K., its corporate
governance code “assumes that directors lose their independence after nine years of service, on the theory that they
become too defensive of the status quo or too close to management to effectively fulfill their oversight role after
that.” Stephen Foley, A Surprising Definition of Board Independence, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 29, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/d2c71dc6-2b27-11e7-9ec8-168383da43b7. The OECD gives discretion to countries to
determine their own criteria for board independence, but suggests using a combination of establishing necessary
“negative” criteria that would disqualify an individual as independent with “positive” examples that show what
qualities may count as independent. Principles, supra note 6, at 51-52.
29
See Principles, supra note 6, at 50 (stating that “[b]oard independence… usually requires that a sufficient number
of board members will need to be independent of management.”).
30
Id. at 51.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 50.
33
Id. at 51.
34
Id. at 40.
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been inconclusive.35 Some studies find a positive correlation while others do not; the conclusion
depends much on which financial criteria, country, and diverse quality is examined, as well as
which scientific method is utilized.36 Nevertheless, board diversity is important. It brings
“diversity of thought to board discussion,”37 increases the “pool of talent and [provides the board
with a] broader mix of leadership skills,”38 and finally, sends a symbolic message to shareholders
and stakeholders.39
In fact, both the OECD and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(“EBRD”), an international investment bank that undertakes periodic assessments of corporate
governance practices of the transition economies that it invests in,40 discusses board diversity as
an important yet often overlooked criteria of good corporate governance. For example, the
OECD encourages boards to “consider if they collectively possess the right mix of background
and competences” that will “avoid groupthink and bring a diversity of thought to board
discussion.”41 To accomplish this, the OECD recommends countries establish “voluntary targets,
disclosure requirements, boardroom quotas, and private initiatives” in order to “enhance gender
diversity on boards and in senior management.”42 Likewise, the EBRD consistently examines
gender diversity on the board of the ten largest listed companies of a country it assesses.43
ii. Disclosure and Transparency

35

Deborah L. Rhode and Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does
Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 284-392 (2014).
36
See Id.
37
Principles, supra note 6, at 53.
38
Rhode and Packel, supra note 35, at 401.
39
Id.
40
History of the EBRD, EBRD, https://www.ebrd.com/who-we-are/history-of-the-ebrd.html.
41
Principles, supra note 6, at 53.
42
Id.
43
Of the 34 EBRD corporate governance assessments that exist, this author has reviewed 15. Each of the 15 reports
include a section examining gender diversity on boards. The author has reviewed country assessments of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Kosovo, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Russia, Tajikistan, Tunisia,
Turkey, Ukraine. See Corporate Governance Sector Assessment, supra note 26.
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Disclosure to shareholders about financial information indicating performance, and nonfinancial information indicating ownership and governance,44 is important to allow shareholders
to exercise their rights on an informed, timely basis.45 It also helps monitor management and
board behavior by keeping shareholders updated of material information. As such, proper
disclosure regimes can help attract new investors seeking to invest in a company they can trust,
while simultaneously reassuring existing investors that there is no unethical behavior or behindthe-scenes measures taken without the shareholder’s knowledge. Thus, the OECD Principles
recommend that companies should timely disclose “all material developments that arise between
regular reports” even if this is not required by the law, and to report information to all
shareholders at the same time “to ensure their equitable treatment.”46 This includes the disclosure
of non-financial information, which may include the identity of major shareholders, the
executive compensation structure, the frequency and contents of discussion of board/shareholder
meetings, the firm’s articles of association, and information about directors, such as their
qualification and share ownership. Simply put, from the corporate governance standpoint, the
more disclosure, the better.
iii. Shareholder Rights
Shareholder rights refer to the ways in which shareholders can effect change through
their vote. The actual—as opposed to nominal—power of shareholders to influence the direction
and future of a firm is important for two main reasons. First, the threat of shareholder activism
hinders management or the board from misusing company assets. Second, it attracts new

44

Principles, supra note 6, at 37.
See Id.
46
Id.
45
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investors as they will be reassured that they will have some power to dictate the way their
investment is managed, whether through calling shareholder meetings or voting.
The OECD enumerates six basic rights that shareholders should have. Of the six, this
paper will focus on three: (1) the right to “obtain relevant and material information on the
corporation on a timely and regular basis”47; (2) the right to “participate and vote in general
shareholder meetings”; and (3) the right to “elect and remove members of the board.”48 The
OECD believes “the right to participate in general shareholder meetings is a fundamental
shareholder right” and thus, shareholders should be able to “participate effectively” in general
shareholders meetings (“GSM”).49 This means allowing shareholders to place items on the
agenda and ask the board questions and propose resolutions—though possibly subject to
“reasonable” restrictions such as only allowing shareholders with a certain market value or
percentage of shares/voting rights so meetings remain efficient.50 Finally, the OECD requires that
voting not be “unduly difficult or expensive,” and criticizes companies that have placed
prohibitions on proxy voting, charging fees for voting, or requiring personal attendance at GSMs
as a prerequisite to voting.51
II.

Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia
In 2008, Morocco and Tunisia instituted their own national corporate governance codes,

modeled after the OECD Principles. However, the state of corporate governance in these
countries leaves room for improvement. The biggest problem is that since compliance to the
Codes are voluntary and not legally required, there is no single regulatory body in either country

47

This is discussed above in the Disclosure and Transparency section.
The three other rights include the right to secure methods of ownership registration, to convey or transfer shares,
and to share in the profits of the corporation. Principles supra note 6, at 20.
49
Principles supra note 6, at 20 (emphasis added).
50
See Principles supra note 6, at 21.
51
Id. at 20.
48
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that supervises whether companies comply with the Code.52 Thus, in Tunisia, none of the ten
largest listed companies discloses whether it is acting consistently with the Code.53 In Morocco,
the EBRD reports that companies do not seem to take the Code’s recommendations to heart.54
The corporate governance codes and practices of Morocco and Tunisia are summarized
below, largely derived from the EBRD assessments of Morocco in 2016 and Tunisia 2017.
a. The Board of Directors
i. Board Independence
In Morocco, the Code defines board independence as independence from “enterprise
management” and “shareholders and partners” that enable “independence of judgment.”55 The
Code recommends organizing under the two-tier system, which separates the chief executive and
chairman positions, instead of the one-tier system in that combines the two functions. This
structural barrier is thought to contribute to board independence, particularly from management.
However, according to the EBRD, companies organize under the one-tier system.56 This furthers
the risk of management influence on the board. While the law does require half of a one-tier
structured board to be non-executive directors, the EBRD warns that due to the concentration of
ownership in Moroccan companies, it is not guaranteed that these non-executive directors will be
independent.57 Finally, none of the ten largest listed companies disclose having independent
board members.58

52

See MOROCCO COUNTRY REPORT, EBRD, (June 2016) (noting that “listed companies are not required to disclose
their compliance with the national [code].”); TUNISIA COUNTRY REPORT, EBRD, (Dec. 2017) (noting “it appears
there is no body monitoring companies’ compliance with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Guide).
53
TUNISIA COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 52, at 16.
54
MOROCCO COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 52, at 5.
55
MOROCCAN CODE OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES (March 2008) (herein referred to as “Morocco
Code”).
56
MOROCCO COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 52, at 7.
57
Id. at 8.
58
Id. at 5.
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The Tunisian Code gives better guidance about board independence. First, the Code does
specify that at least one third of the board should be independent. Second, independence is
defined with more detail: an independent director is someone with “no direct or indirect
relationship with the corporation… with its group’s companies or with its executive
management.”59 Third, the Code provides a list of what independent directors should not be, such
as an employee of the company or have family ties with a corporate officer.60 However, in
practice, Tunisia does not necessarily fare better than Morocco. For example, only two of the ten
largest listed companies disclose having independent board members; and both are banks, which
are required to have at least two independent directors by law.61
ii. Diversity
Board diversity is encouraged by both codes. Morocco’s Code recommends the board be
“made up of members… who impart a diversity (in terms of training, professional experience,
male-female balance, age, nationality, etc.),”62 but does not specify a percentage of the board that
should be independent or give more instruction on which diverse criteria should be prioritized.
Tunisia’s Code is more detailed in specifying the various areas in which board members should
be experienced in—finances, accounting, management, directorships, etc.63 Furthermore, it
recommends directors be of different ages, experiences, profiles, and expertise.64 Still, it does not
specify which quality to prioritize.
Moreover, gender diversity is severely lacking. The EBRD has found that in Morocco, of
the ten largest listed companies, only nine disclose its board composition. Of this nine, only four

59

CODE OF BEST PRACTICE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2008) (herein referred to as “Tunisia Code”).
Id. at § 2.1.2.
61
TUNISIA COUNTRY REPORT supra note 52, at 8.
62
MOROCCO CODE supra note 55, at § 3.4.1.
63
TUNISIA CODE, supra note 59, at § 2.1.7.
64
Id. at note 3.
60
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companies have one female director each. Therefore, there are four women out of the 67
directors among nine companies, which means 5.09% of the directors sitting on Morocco’s top
ten listed companies are women.65 Tunisia fares slightly better. All ten companies largest listed
companies disclose their board composition. There are six females on six boards of the ten,
meaning there are six women out of 84 directors among the ten companies. Thus, 7.61% of the
directors sitting on Tunisia’s top ten listed companies are women.66 The desire to expand board
diversity is evident in both codes, but the realities fall short of such desires.
b. Disclosure and Transparency
Morocco and Tunisia need more transparency in their corporate governance practices. In
Morocco, companies comply with financial disclosure requirements, and disclose audited
financial statements and annual reports. However, the disclosure of non-financial information is
limited. Although the Code encourages disclosure of non-financial material such as the
qualification of directors, board meetings and activities, and governing documents, in reality, the
EBRD has found that companies do not disclosure such information. This is likely because there
is no legal requirement to disclose this information, as compliance to the code is voluntary. As
such, of the ten largest listed companies in Morocco, none discloses the board’s qualifications
and activities, minutes of the general shareholder meetings, or its articles of association.67
Tunisia also suffers from disclosure deficiencies, particularly of non-financial
information. Although all ten of the largest listed companies provide the names of their directors,
they do not provide information about their qualification.68 Further, none of the companies

65

MOROCCO COUNTRY REPORT supra note 52, at 8.
TUNISIA COUNTRY REPORT supra note 52, at 9.
67
MOROCCO COUNTRY REPORT supra note 52, at 7 and 9.
68
TUNISIA COUNTRY REPORT supra note 52, at 10.
66
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disclose GSM minutes or their articles of association online,69 despite the Code urging that they
do so. The EBRD criticizes the disclosure regime in Tunisia as “generally poor,” and not giving
“stakeholders… a comprehensive view of the company’s organisation and structure.”70
Disclosure is particularly important for MENA countries, as they have been scarred by a
reputation of “corruption and unethical business practices.”71 To remedy this, transparency must
be prioritized to signal to investors that they will be routinely informed about what the company
is doing with their money.
c. Shareholder Rights
Unlike the U.S. or U.K. in which the principal-agent agency problem72 presents much of
the basis of corporate governance issues, the MENA region suffers from a different shareholder
rights problem. Many MENA businesses—particularly successful ones that are big-name market
players or listed on stock exchanges—are family owned enterprises or state-owned entities.73
This means that many of the shareholders themselves are part of management with skin in the
game.74 As such, the shareholder rights issue to address in MENA is how to protect minority
shareholders.75 One measure, discussed above, is to provide more transparency to shareholders
through a tighter disclosure regime. Another is to give them more expansive rights and powers.
Morocco and Tunisia fare similarly regarding shareholder rights. In Morocco, the Code
attempts to afford greater voting rights to shareholders. It recommends companies allow proxy
voting and give shareholders the right to participate in GSMs regardless of how many shares

69

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5 and 6.
71
Rossouw supra note 9, at 95.
72
The principal-agency problem refers to the problem when the interests of the agent (management or board) may
diverge with, and thus not best represent, the principal (shareholders).
73
See Alissa Amico, Corporate Governance Enforcement in the Middle East and North Africa: Evidence and
Priorities, OECD (2014).
74
Id. at 38.
75
Id.
70
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they own.76 It also recommends that the board attend GSMs to answer shareholders’ questions.77
In practice, however, there is no realistic way for minority voters to overcome the entrenched
majority or controlling shareholders. While proxy voting is allowed, there is no cumulative
voting or disproportional voting rights. This means that minority shareholders have no way of
pooling their votes together to vote against a board member or amendment that is management
favored or majority/controlling shareholder favored. Next, shareholders with 10% of the share
capital may call GSMs, and shareholders with 5% can add items to the GSM and nominate board
members.78 However, because compliance with the Code is voluntary, and because the board is
only recommended to attend GSMs to answer shareholder questions, it is possible that the board
may not show up at all. The EBRD calls his a “serious impediment for shareholders.”79
Likewise, the rights granted to shareholders in Tunisia are also restrictive. For example,
while proxy voting is also permitted, the Tunisian Code urges companies to adopt the one-shareone vote rule.80 Companies do adopt this voting regime, which again arguably eliminates any real
chance minority shareholders have at overtaking the majority or larger shareholders through
cumulative voting tactics.
III.

The Future of Corporate Governance in Morocco and Tunisia
Nonetheless, credit should be given to Morocco and Tunisia for their efforts to enhance

corporate governance oversight in their respective countries. However, the realities of political
fragility, corruption, and societal unrest render the future of corporate governance in Morocco,
and especially Tunisia, uncertain.

76

MOROCCO CODE supra note 55, at § 1.7 and § 1.10.
MOROCCO COUNTRY REPORT supra note 52, at 13.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
TUNISIA CODE, supra note 59, at § 1.1.
77
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a. Morocco
Unlike many of its neighbors, Morocco was able to “avoid large-scale turmoil”81 during
the Arab Spring, as King Mohammed VI quickly conceded some powers to parliament by
establishing a constitutional monarchy. For example, the 2016 reforms of laws governing
freedom of expression included an end to prison time for defamation of certain individuals,82 as
well as an end to the government’s ability “to seize or suspend publications on the basis of
political content without a court order.”83 However, distrust of the government for corruption
continue, and criticism of the regime for the lack of progress has recently resurfaced.84
Nevertheless, Morocco remains relatively stable compared to much of its MENA neighbors such
as Libya and Syria—largely due to the “semi-authoritarian”85 regime of the king.
b. Tunisia
Tunisia faces major challenges in the upcoming year. First, this fall, Tunisia will hold
presidential and parliamentary elections, rendering its political future uncertain.86 Moreover,
distrust of the political system has increased; 81% of Tunisians believe politicians are not paying
attention to their needs.87 Second, Tunisia’s economy is fragile. The unemployment rate is at
15%, the rate of inflation has doubled since 2011 to 7.4%, and tourism revenue, its third-largest
contributor to the economy, has dropped from $3.9 billion in 2009 to $1.7billion.88 Third, its
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democracy may be backsliding. A 2019 Brookings study recorded the population’s growing
disillusionment with democracy, and found that in 2018, only 46% of Tunisians agreed that
“democracy was preferable to other forms of government,89 as opposed to the 70% in 2013.
Instances of backsliding that increase citizens’ distrust of the political system include the
following examples: in 2016, the Prime Minister tried prominent businessmen in military court
as a “war on corruption,” though many believed he did this in retaliation as they “had been
funding [his] rivals”90; there have been more than 100 cases of torture since 2013;91 the
government has repeatedly tried to shut down a LGBT rights group, with the lawsuit continuing
in court even today.92 Lastly, the future of Tunisia’s legal system remains tenuous. The
Constitutional Court, established in 2014 by the Constitution, has yet to see its 12 members
approved.93 The Brookings study recommends the Constitutional Court be firmly established
before the 2019 elections to prevent an incumbent takeover and provide a “crucial check on a
future president who seeks to consolidate power.”94 In sum, the political, economic, social, and
legal structure of Tunisia may undergo major changes in the next few years, rendering the
country’s commitment to corporate governance uncertain. In turn, this uncertainty makes strong
corporate governance practices more necessary than ever.
IV.

Conclusion
The corporate governance codes of Morocco and Tunisia attempt to impose tighter

monitoring controls and wider disclosure burdens on companies. However, the Codes do not
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necessarily succeed. As both Codes are not legal mechanisms—that is, a company can choose to
comply with the Code and display their compliance, but they do not have to—companies choose
the option not to. In the end, corporate governance practices can only be successful through
proper and effective enforcement. While the stock exchanges,95 bank regulators,96 and securities
commissions of these countries attempt to regulate, in their own way and jurisdiction, corporate
governance practices, there needs to be a clearer demarcation of responsibility and jurisdiction
between the different public authorities that are charged with enforcing corporate governance.97
To overcome the MENA region’s current, past, and future cultural, political, and religious
impediments to corporate governance, top-down enforcement from these regulators needs to be
improved, and regulators need to make compliance with the Code or Code-recommended
practices to be mandatory.
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